Publications

Working Papers

Pretextual Stop Restriction and Policing: Evidence from Los Angeles

Job Market Paper
This paper explores the impact of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)’s restriction on pretextual stops on policing behavior and public safety. Using data on all California traffic stops, I find compelling evidence that the policy effectively reduced minor traffic stops, defined as stops for equipment or non-moving violations. However, I find little evidence that the overall number of total stops decreased, potentially due to police substitution behavior. This finding is consistent with my economic framework, which suggests that police officers will respond to increased scrutiny placed on some tasks by shifting their behavior to other tasks. At the same time, I find that this policy led to an approximately 15 percent reduction in the number of racial minorities stopped by police officers. Focusing on traffic stop outcomes, I document that the number of stops resulting in a warning decreased, and conversely, the number of stops resulting in a citation may have increased. Moreover, the policy led to fewer searches and contraband found, but little change in contraband seized. Finally, I find little evidence that the number of reported crimes, arrests, and traffic fatalities increased following the restriction of pretextual stops. Together, my findings imply that the LAPD’s pretextual stop restriction achieved its intended goal of reducing racial disparities without diminishing public safety.

Selected Works in Progress

The Effect of Oregon Measure 110 (with Ben Hansen & David Hall)

In-Person Schooling and Juvenile Violence (with Ben Hansen & Joe Sabia)